Toronto – Many politicians and military figures have recently been predicting the inevitability of war between Eritrea and Ethiopia, following the collapse of what initially appeared to be a warm relationship between Eritrean President Isaias Afwerki and Ethiopian Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed and further deterioration of their relation. The relationship deteriorated in less than three years, though the underlying causes remain unclear to the public.
The latest remarks about the inevitability of war between the two nations came from General Abebe Teklehaymanot, former commander of the Ethiopian Defense Force, also known by his nom de guerre, Jobe, from his time as a TPLF guerrilla fighter.
In a recent interview with a Tigrigna-language cyber media outlet, Jobe was quoted by Reporter as stating, “The two countries are likely heading to war.” He pointed to several indicators suggesting this trajectory. Beyond exchanging accusations about war mongering, both nations have been visibly engaged in military mobilizations in recent weeks.
Jobe emphasized that the outcome of a potential war is unpredictable. He argued that understanding the war’s objectives would be crucial to forecasting its consequences. He identified two possible motivations for such a conflict.
The first could be the desire to seize control of Assab, a port located just sixty kilometers from Ethiopia’s northeastern border. Although the port has remained within Eritrea’s territory, many believe Ethiopia lost access to it due to the late Prime Minister Meles Zenawi’s perceived malicious negligence —a move some have even labeled as treasonous.
The second motivation Jobe suggested could be the removal of Shabia—a guerrilla-era term referring to what is now the People’s Front for Democracy and Justice (PFDJ), still led by Isaias Afwerki. This would align with a regime change agenda. Notably, a significant number of politically active Eritreans believed the U.S. government supported such an agenda. However, under the Trump administration, this no longer seemed to be the case. But Trumps policy is yet to be seen.
Jobe also speculated that various state actors might intervene in the conflict for their own strategic reasons. Among the potential interveners, he highlighted Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and the United States.
Reflecting on the past, Jobe expressed regret over the failure to neutralize Shabia during the 1998–2000 war. He claimed, “We had the military capacity to do so.” Reports from that time suggest that a major rift within the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF)-led government stemmed from disagreements over how to handle Eritrea. While the faction led by the late Meles Zenawi argued that “Ethiopia would face sanctions if the army advanced all the way to Asmara,” the opposing faction—which included Jobe—accused Meles’s group of being Temberkaki, a term roughly translating to “submissive.” Ultimately, Meles’s faction prevailed, and the opposing group was purged, with some members arrested.
Jobe also criticized the decision to allow Eritrea to rebuild its military capabilities after the war ended in 2000.Tthe subsequent years had been a period of “no peace, no war,” which persisted until Abiy Ahmed normalized relations in 2018. However, these efforts unraveled within three years, plunging the two nations back into hostility.
Like current TPLF leaders in Mekelle, Jobe—who currently resides outside the U.S.—expressed concern that Tigray would become the primary theater of war if conflict were to erupt between Ethiopia and Eritrea.