I would stress at the outset: this is an initial attempt to consider these questions. I wish to interrogate issues that have only limited public discussion and my analysis is tentative. I would welcome any informed criticism.
By Martin Plaut
There is one central question that is genuinely puzzling about Eritrea: why its people, who fought with such courage and sacrifice for thirty years to achieve independence and freedom, only to allow the fruits of their suffering to be denied them for more than three decades. What Eritreans have endured since they captured Asmara from Ethiopian forces in 1991 is well documented. At times they have protested; at times they have revolted, (as in 2013 when mutinous troops reached Forto on the edge of the capital, only to be outwitted and then brutally repressed).[1]
The Eritrean public have generally kept their heads down and not risked offending the regime, despite President Isaias Afwerki’s lack of legitimacy. He is a leader who has never held an election, scrapped the draft constitution, thrown thousands into jail and sent troops into wars in Sudan, Congo, Yemen, Djibouti, Yemen and Ethiopia, with an immense loss of life.[2]
All this is well known. Yet Eritreans appear as far from finding a means of ending this dictatorship as they ever have been. Political parties, all promising an end to the suffering have come and gone. Movements like Yiakl have been formed, only to apparently fracture and fail.[3] Some of the reasons for this are obvious. Having to operate primarily among a diaspora is notoriously difficult. The factions that emerged when the EPLF split from the ELF in the 1960’s continue to exist, competing with each other and plaguing attempts at unity. New parties and movements come and go, leaving little in their wake.
The leaders are partly to blame, but President Isaias’s hand is frequently involved in fracturing the opposition. Isaias learned a great deal during his time in China, particularly about using Marxism-Leninism to control his own party.[4] It was not for nothing that he led the Eritrean People’s Revolutionary Party from its inception on 4 April 1971.[5] This was the real power in the land – the party within a party that controlled the EPLF. Isaias has dominated Eritrean affairs ever since, although occasionally being challenged by internal opposition, including some of his former allies in the G-15 in 2001.[6] His opponents have ended up dead, imprisoned or isolated. Even more insidious have been the use of propaganda in units such as ‘zero-three’ that poisons the minds of Eritreans against their opponents.[7] This supplements the work of ‘zero-nine’ which acts to enforce the party’s decisions. Both operate inside Eritrea as well as abroad. As Amnesty International reported in 2019:
The long arms of the state, stretching through Eritrean diplomatic missions and members and supporters of the ruling PJDF party, closely monitor activities and unleash various forms of threats, attacks and harassment on Eritreans and non-Eritreans who are real or perceived critics of the government and its human rights record. The government has mobilized and uses the ruling party’s youth wing, which is active abroad, notably in the United Kingdom, Switzerland, the Netherlands, Sweden, Norway, and Kenya, to harass, intimidate and threaten individuals and entities that criticize the Eritrean’s government’s human rights record. The long arms of the Eritrean government did not also spare foreign journalists and UN representatives from direct or state sponsored physical and online harassment and intimidation.[8]
Eritrean government agents or supporters have relabelled themselves ‘Eri-Blood’ ‘The Fourth Front’ and ‘52’ act as pro-regime enforcers, guarding ‘festivals’ abroad which are used to provide funds and political backing for the regime. As the Canadian Globe and Mail explained:[9][JS2]
Pro-regime activists, meanwhile, are fighting back. A loyalist group, called Eri Blood or The Fourth Front, has mobilized to defend the festivals with violence if necessary. In Canada, and elsewhere in the world, the two sides ended up battling with wooden sticks, flagpoles, metal rods, rocks and stones. “It’s the new front line,” said Kjetil Tronvoll, a Norwegian professor of peace and conflict studies who specializes in Eritrea and Ethiopia. “As the diaspora youth have organized better to confront the regime at these festivals and meetings, the regime itself is also fighting back in the diaspora,” he said. “The violence is not only from the opponents, but also because the regime’s supporters in the diaspora are being trained and instructed to hit back with violence against these protests. I think these conflicts will escalate in the future.”
None of the above is any surprise to Eritreans: it is what they have come to expect.
What follows is less certain and more complex. The question remains: what makes Eritrea such a complex nation? To examine this will require looking at the elements that make up its people or its peoples, depending on your perspective. First, without rehearsing Eritrea’s complex history down the centuries or becoming bogged down in anthropology, who are the peoples who are considered part of this one nation? Second, how did these divisions lead to such difficult relationships between the country’s ethnic groups that they have been impotent in the face of acute internal repression?
Eritrea’s peoples
The people of Eritrea have been traditionally seen as divided into various ethnic groups. The CIA factbook – a normally accurate source of basic information – suggests that they consist of the Tigrinya 50%, Tigre 30%, Saho 4%, Afar 4%, Kunama 4%, Bilen 3%, Hedareb/Beja 2%, Nara 2%, Rashaida 1%.[10] Like all such ‘facts’ they hide as much as they explain. Nations are almost inevitably divided along ethnic lines. In Britain, for example, there are many more ethnic groups than the Scots, Welsh, Irish and English. The Cornish, for example, claim their own rights, as do the Gallic speaking Scots. This is before one begins to add the many communities who have settled in Britain. This includes the French [JS3] (some 300,000 of whom live in the UK) or the 180,000 strong Somali community which has lived in Britain for generations, encouraged by the opening of the Suez Canal in 1869. Eritreans numbered 26,100 in England and Wales, according to the 2021 UK Census.[11]
All peoples and nations also have their own myths, legends, prejudices and beliefs which are handed down the generations and form an important part of popular culture. For example, the Germans look back to the time the Germanic tribes defeated the Romans at the Battle of Teutoburg Forest in 9 A.D. as a symbol of resistance to foreign domination. The battle between Serbs and Ottomans on the Field of Blackbirds in 1389 shares a similar status in Serbian imagination.[12] Such belief systems can unite, or to divide, a nation. They are frequently drawn on by politicians.
In exploring what has divided and united Eritrea’s peoples we need to consider these questions, since it is surely inaccurate to point only to the wiles of Isaias Afwerki to explain why democratic movements have proved so fissiparous and prone to collapse. To look at this I will examine two aspects of Eritrean life: the role of ethnic minorities and the question of the Italian askaris[JS4] .
Minorities pose a problem for all nations. How to give them an appropriate weight in public affairs is a difficult question across the globe and Eritrea is no exception. Minorities can be abused in many ways, but they can also be mobilised by regimes for their own purposes – both for internal purposes and by neighbouring states. The situation of Eritrea’s minorities is understood by its people, but is less commonly explored in academic work.
The Nara people are a case in point. A mostly Muslim people who live north of Barentu, they are sometimes termed ‘Barya’. It is a term designating a slave in Amharic.[13] They were converted from their traditional religion to Islam in the seventeenth century, but this did not save them from “continual raids by their Muslim and Christian neighbours, who often enslaved them.”[14] According to oral history these differences often arose around competition for grazing the Gash-Barka region.[15]
‘The competition over land and the settlement of diverse ethnic groups in the Gash-Setit area are themselves sufficient factors that contribute to tensions. There are also other contributing factors. These factors include the policies of the state, the contempt of the Tigrinnya (sic.) towards other groups and the legacy of the historical animosity between the Kunama and other ethnic groups of the country.’[16]
The combination of raids and enslavement meant that the Nara welcomed Italian colonialism when it arrived, since the Italians recognised their independent tribal leaders and ended the raids against them.[17] During the 1950’s under British rule ethnic tensions led to conflict as the various ethnic groups competed for grazing.[18] Some Nara joined the Eritrean Liberation Front in the 1960’s. This was just one of the factors that led to antagonism between Nara and the EPLF.
If relations with the Nara were poor, relations with the Kunama were even more difficult. The Kunama also inhabit the Gash-Barka region (previously known as Gash-Setit) and are sedentary agriculturalists, rather than pastoral people. In 1984-85 the Ethiopian census numbered them at 100,000.[19] They too have been enslaved down the years. Before Italian colonisation Ethiopian highlanders raided the Kunama, who followed their traditional faith, with the Kunama occasionally carrying out reprisal raids, sometimes taking women captive.[20] The Ethiopian general, Ras Alula raided the Kunama under Emperor Yohannes and then Menelik, with Kunama men fighting the incomers and women and children hiding in caves, only to be smoked out by the raiders.[21] These events are seared into Kunama consciousness, with one form of abuse between Kunama during disputes declaring: “I curse you that you will be captured by Abyssinian, Algheden Tigre and Turks respectively.”[22]
Italian colonialism brought a measure of relief for the Kunama, with an end to raids from Ethiopia. This period is looked back on with nostalgia and the Italians are regarded as better than the regimes of Haile Selassie, the Dergue or the current Eritrean government.[23] The Kunama volunteered to join the Italian army as askaris, with men walking to Mendefera and Asmara to seek recruitment.[24] The Italian uniforms which incorporated a fez and a cape with tassels is said to have been particularly appealing to the Kunama.
Relations with the Eritrean liberation movements were far more difficult, with the ELF being accused of carrying out raids on Kunama communities in the 1960’s. This had catastrophic consequences, leading ‘some Kunama to support Ethiopian rule after the start of the armed struggle. In 1965, the Ethiopians recruited a Kunama militia. A decade later, the Derg courted Kunama loyalty, while an already widespread, racist perception among non-Nilotic Eritreans (Muslim and Christian) that the Kunama were somehow ‘not Eritrean’ further alienated them from nationalist fronts.’[25] Relations were mended, to some degree by the EPLF, which provided Kunama with social services and education, but this was not to last.
Matters came to a head during Eritrea’s disastrous border war with Ethiopia in 1998 – 2000. Much of the fighting took place in Kunama areas, causing widespread destruction and displacement. ‘This, coupled with anger over conscription of Kunama youth for the war effort and the resettlement of Tigrinya-speaking refugees in Kunama areas – under way since the 1940s but intensified in the 1990s – fuelled resentment in many of these communities.’[26] It led to the formation of a Kunama based armed resistance movement, the Democratic Movement for the Liberation of Eritrean Kunama, DMLEK. It also resulted in what is described as a ‘widespread belief’ that Kunama were collaborators with Ethiopian governments, and not loyal Eritreans.[27] Members of DMLEK were accused of accompanying the Ethiopian army during their occupation of the Gash and Setit areas.[28] Although they were not the only Eritreans who worked with the Ethiopian invaders, other ethnic groups were not considered ‘collaborators.’[29] Alexander Naty remarks that use of the term ‘collaborator’ is only made about the Kunama. He goes on to recall that: ‘There were thousands of Kunama in the ELF and later in the EPLF who died for Eritrea. There are thousands of young Kunama in the Eritrean Defense Forces who are dying for Eritrea. How would they feel when they are constantly reminded that the Kunama are collaborators and traitors.’[30] Is it any surprise that, as the Minority Rights Group observed: The Kunama ‘have had a deep distrust of the EPLF and have been repressed for years because they are seen to be close to Ethiopia.’[31]
The Kunama and the Nara are by no means exceptional among Eritrea’s minorities. The Rashaida, some of whom move between Arabia, Sudan and Eritrea, are generally regarded by other ethnicities as aloof and even dangerous.[32] It is a reputation perhaps derived from their history of involvement of enslavement of other Eritrean peoples. In the 1890’s, for example, they were witnessed taking Beja people who had been captured in the Kassala region to Arabia.[33] ‘Almost all that party of slaves had been taken over to the Arabian side of the Red Sea, and sold there in open market.’
Eritrea’s Askaris
The Italian colonisers recruited and came to rely on large numbers of Eritreans for their local security and in their wars against Ethiopia and Libya. Between 1890 and 1941 more than 130,000 Eritreans served as askaris, representing one in ten of the labour force.[34] This helped re-shape Eritrean the economy, depriving households of labour for their farms, but also providing large sums of money, which drew Eritreans into the modern economy. Eritrean troops served with distinction in many campaigns, beginning with their contribution at the battle of Adwa in 1896, when 2,000 of the 5,000 Eritreans, who accompanied the Italian invasion of Ethiopia, losing their lives.[35] They held out even when other brigades broke and fled. Some 800 askaris who were captured by the Ethiopians were treated as traitors. They had their right hands and left feet amputated.[36]
Despite the sacrifices, young Eritreans were not put off being recruited by the Italians. Better wages drew some 60,000 to volunteer to serve in Libya from 1911 to 1932. When Mussolini invaded Ethiopia in 1935 conscription was introduced and a further 60,000 askaris joined Italian forces.[37] Discontent with their treatment under the fascists led to some desertions, but askaris went on to train Ethiopian militia after Addis Ababa was captured by the Italians and Ethiopia was largely occupied. The askaris fought alongside the Italians when British led forces invaded from Sudan in 1940. After the defeat of the Italians at the battle of Keren in March 1941 over 9,000 Eritreans who had served as askaris were interned in Sudan before finally being demobilised. As they had fought with an enemy force they received no compensation from the British Military Administration, leading to increased hardship, unemployment and poverty.
The askari experience appears to have had a considerable impact on Eritrean culture and politics. Recruitment by the Italians appears to have welded Eritreans together.
The massive recruitment of Eritreans in the colonial administration and especially in the army changed their own perception of their ethnic and religious identity. Colonial soldiers were first of all taught to serve under the Italian banner and to be loyal to their armed section. Even though differences in ethnicity and religion were to a certain extent taken into account in the formation of battalions, platoons and divisions, these were often socially and culturally mixed. As Dirar points out, fighting side by side with men from neighbouring territories who had also migrated to the city at least partially smoothed ‘localism and ethnic-based antagonisms, and paved the way for the development of a germinal Eritrean nationalist feeling.’ [38]
If Italian colonialism helped unite Eritreans, the same cannot be said of the British Administration. This was partly because of the high-handed attitude adopted by British officers and officials. But it was also because the administration sought to dismember Eritrea. Britain, which elected a Labour government at the end of the war committed to ending Empire, had no interest in gaining a new colony. Administrators sought to either divide Eritrea or unite it with Ethiopia.[JS5] Astier Almedom suggests that London planned to exchange the Eritrean highlands for the Ogaden, while attempting to unite the Eritrean lowlands with Sudan.[39]
In the event, British administrators failed to come up with an acceptable plan and left the issue to the United Nations. Their indecision produced uncertainty and provoked ethnic and religious tensions which led to clashes that Eritrea had not witnessed under the Italians. The ethnic violence was recorded by the British administrator, Gerald Trevaskis.
The structure of Eritrean political unity, erected during the Italian regime, had concealed the fundamental conflicts of culture and interest among the Eritrean communities…Fighting between the Christian villagers of the Hamasain and the Serai and the Moslem Bani Amir assumed a new and ugly ferocity. Fighting broke out once more between the Kunama and their unwelcome neighbours in the old battle-ground of the Gash-Setit Lowlands, and, just as fiercely been the Moslem Saho and their Christian neighbours in the Akelli Gusai. On the Plateau itself the sturdy Moslem minority in the Serai clashed with the Christian majority and, with help from the Bani Amir, and to some extent from the Saho, gave a surprisingly good account of itself. The small, feeble minority in the Hamasain, after a brief effervescence, was terrorized into inactive silence. On the northern flanks of the Plateau occasional clashes occurred between the villagers of the Hamasain and the Tigray clans of the Coastal Plain. The only parts of Eritrea to which conflagration did not spread were the territory’s remote extremities – the Northern Highlands and the Dankali Lowlands. [40]
Christians agitated for unification with Ethiopia while Muslims wished to be united with Sudan. This is well researched. Trevaskis concluded: ‘Although no Eritrean, Italian, or British officer ever doubted that the Unionist Party and Ethiopian Government had instigated the disturbances few seriously credited them with having intended so general a conflagration.’[41] Astier Almedom challenged this interpretation of events, arguing that it was the British who provoked the disputes. They were, ‘worse than the Italians who were not as deceitful and underhanded. The BMA seldom honored its promises, and it was even more exploitative – Eritreans were always severely punished with heavy fines for apparently exercising their rights to articulate their concerns through peaceful demonstrations which turned into riots every time the British or Italian police used force to hunt the so called “ringleaders”.’[42] In any event, the British left and Eritrea was federated with Ethiopia and then incorporated into Haile Selassie’s empire, only to see the beginning of an armed struggle that finally resulted in the EPLF taking Asmara in 1991 and to internationally recognised independence and sovereignty two years later.
Some lessons
What can be drawn from this exploration of the ethnic question and the role of the askaris in Eritrean society? In particular, what could occur once President Isaias Afwerki no longer controls the fate of the country with an iron hand?
We have seen the depth of the divisions that have existed between ethnic groups; divisions which are then overlayed by religious differences. In the debate about unification with Ethiopia in the 1940’s these spilled over into open conflicts. The religious differences reared their heads once more in the split between the ELF and EPLF in the 1960’s and 1970’s[JS6] , causing divisions which have yet to be eradicated. Some have suggested that these rifts have been exaggerated.
Centuries of social intermingling, economic interaction and shared suffering under different rulers had rendered ethnic and religious distinctions ambiguous and, in many cases, interchangeable.[43]
The case that Professor Gaim Kibreab makes here is powerfully argued. Of course, it is possible that a new Eritrean movement will arise which not only succeeds in uniting the Eritrean opposition but manages to challenge and finally overthrow [JS7] the current regime. The emergence of Brigade N’Hamedu, or the Blue Revolution, brought Eritrean members of the diaspora together in Addis Ababa in January 2025.[44] However, it is too early to come to any conclusion about how this will develop. If the past is any indication of the future, they are likely to struggle to overcome the differences outlined above.
It is perhaps worth considering the comparable situation in Yugoslavia before its demise in 1992. While there had been ethnic tensions between the nine or more ethnic groups, they had existed alongside one another in relative peace until the death of Tito in 1980, at which point one of Europe’s most vicious conflicts since the Second World War erupted, leaving over 130,000 dead. Similar examples are scattered around the world. Eritreans cannot assume that ethnic and religious divisions will not emerge once President Isaias is no longer in charge.[JS8]
If this is the one side of the argument, the legacy of the askaris is the other. They appear to have overcome divisions under the Italians. They became a resolute fighting force that contributed to Italy’s wars in Ethiopia, Libya and against the British. Ethnic and religious issues appear to have been left behind when Eritreans from very different backgrounds put on their uniforms. During the thirty-year war of independence Eritreans came together, even though they fought bitter civil wars that still resonate to this day. Since 1991 they have been brought together in a national army. Indefinite conscription, in the guise of National Service, has taken a terrible toll on Eritrea’s young people. However, they have worked and fought together along Eritrea’s borders, and in President Isaias’s many foreign wars.
There have been, and continue to be, the evolution of innumerable Eritrean political parties and movements. Some are credible, most are not.
The hope must surely be that once the dictatorship ends, the army, drawing on the legacy of the askaris and the sacrifices of Eritrean fighters and troops down the years, will hold the country together. What other organised force could overcome the differences which have been sketched above, or face the intrigues that are likely to be fostered by foreign powers?
Historically, divided countries, when faced with an external existential threat such as an invasion by a military power or by a pandemic, have come together for the common good. Might this happen when internal forces (the military, the civilian population, the diaspora coming home) may immediately have the opportunity to “re-start” Eritrea?
Let us hope so.
[1] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2013_Eritrean_Army_mutiny
[2] https://martinplaut.com/2023/01/04/eritrea-president-isaiass-forgotten-wars/
[4] https://theconversation.com/eritreas-isaias-afwerki-a-tactical-authoritarian-who-might-be-president-for-life-147963
[5] Dan Connell and Tom Killion, Historical Dictionary of Eritrea, The Scarcrow Press, 2011, p. 314
[6] Ibid. p. 276-277
[7] https://harnnet.org/index.php/articles-corner/english-articles/item/7338-zero-three-bado-seleste-the-eritrean-propaganda-machine
[8] Amnesty International, Eritrea: Repression without borders. Threats to human rights defenders abroad, AFR 64/0542/2019
[9] Globe and Mail, Eritrea’s strife goes global as diasporas, including those in Canada, clash at cultural festivals, 18 January 2024
[10] https://www.cia.gov/the-world-factbook/countries/eritrea/
[11] Small populations, England and Wales: Census 2021, Office of National Statistics,
Accessed 3 February 2025
[12] https://www.historynet.com/hallowed-ground-field-blackbirds-kosovo/
[13] Marvin L. Bender, Analysis of a Barya Word List, Anthropological Linguistics, Vol. 10, No. 9, 1968, p. 1
[14] Dan Connell and Tom Killion, Historical Dictionary of Eritrea, The Scarecrow Press, 2011, p. 391
[15] Alexander Naty. Potential conflicts in the former Gash- Setit region, western Eritrea: threats to peace and security, 2002
http://harep.org/ifaapr/Kunama_Conflicts_Alexander_.pdf
Accessed 2 February 2025
[16] Ibid. p. 4
[17] Dan Connell and Tom Killion, Historical Dictionary of Eritrea, op. cit. p. 391
[18] Alexander Naty, Potential conflicts in the former Gash- Setit region, op. cit, p. 5
[19] Alexander Naty, Memories of the Kunama of Eritrea towards Italian Colonialism, Africa: Rivista trimestrale di studi e documentazione dell’Instituto Italiano per L’Africa e L’Oriente, Vol. 56, No. 4, 2001, p. 576
[20] Ibid. p. 576-577, Dan Connell and Tom Killion, Historical Dictionary of Eritrea, p. 337
[21] Ibid. p. 578
[22] Ibid. p. 578
[23] Ibid. p. 580
[24] Ibid. p. 581
[25] Dan Connell and Tom Killion, Historical Dictionary of Eritrea, op. cit. p. 338
[26] Ibid. p. 339
[27] Alexander Naty, Memories of the Kunama of Eritrea towards Italian Colonialism, op. cit. p. 588
[28] Ibid. p. 588
[29] Ibid. p. 588
[30] Ibid. p. 589
[31] Minority Rights Group, Kunama and Nara in Eritrea, undated
Accessed 2 February 2025
[32] Dan Connell and Tom Killion, Historical Dictionary of Eritrea, op. cit. p. 438
[33] Anthony d’Avray, Lords of the Red Sea: The history of a Red Sea society from the sixteenth to the nineteenth centuries, Harrassowitz Verlag, 1996, p. 216
[34] Dan Connell and Tom Killion, Historical Dictionary of Eritrea, op. cit. p. 92
[35] Ibid. p. 93
[36] Sean McLachlan, Armies of the Adowa Campaign 1896. Bloomsbury, 2011 p. 23
[37] Dan Connell and Tom Killion, Historical Dictionary of Eritrea, op. cit. p. 93
[38] Alessandra El Hariri, ‘Perceiving Italy’: an exploration of asylum-seekers’s strategies. The case of Eritrean asylum seekers, PhD, University of Essex, 2017. Uoldelul Chelati Dirar, From Warriors to Urban Dwellers
Ascari and the Military Factor in the Urban Development of Colonial Eritrea, Cahiers d’Etudes africaines, online.
Accessed 2 February 2025
[39] Astier Almedom, Re-reading the Short and Long-Rigged History of Eritrea 1941–1952: Back to the Future? Nordic Journal of African Studies, Vol. 15, No 2, 2006, p. 122
[40] Gerald Kennedy Nicholas Trevaskis wrote in Eritrea, A Colony in Transition: 1941-52, Oxford University Press, 1960, p. 109
[41] Ibid. p. 110
[42] Astier Almedom, Re-reading the Short and Long-Rigged History of Eritrea 1941–1952, op. cit. p. 116
[43] Gaim Kibreab, Ethnicity, religion and British policy of disposal of Eritrea, 1941 – 1952, Africa: Rivista trimestrale di studi e documentazione dell’Instituto italiano per l’Africa e l’Oriente, No. 60, 2005, p. 171
[44] https://martinplaut.com/2025/01/23/brigade-nhamedus-forthcoming-addis-ababa-conference/
[JS1]Possible sub-title: Complexities of the make-up of the Eritrean population, past and present – a help or hindrance?
[JS2]This Globe and Mail article requires a subscription to open.
[JS3]My maternal ancestors were Huguenots moved to Nottingham… John
[JS4]Ascaris is a roundworm, often a parasite in humans’ small intestines – a problem in Ethiopia and Eritrea.
[JS5]You could add that even a historical book was entitled with this reference, “I Didn’t Do It For You” by M. Wrong.
[JS6]Consider 1960s and 1970s, without the apostrophes here and elsewhere in the article.
[JS7]Succeed?
[JS8]Consider “out of the picture.” (Seems to have a more final tone.)